1. Kant and Heidegger on the creation of objectivity

Both Ricoeur in *The Rule of Metaphor* (1978a) and Hausman in *Metaphor and Art* (1989) draw on Kantian ontology to explain how a metaphor can create new yet appropriate meaning. Hausman, on the one hand, explains new metaphorical meaning by the direct proposal of an ontology. This is made up of unique, extraconceptual particulars akin to Kant’s things in themselves which, Hausman maintains, stand as the referents of inventive metaphors and, therefore, as the items which guarantee their appropriateness. Ricoeur, on the other hand, turns indirectly to ontology via an allusion to Kant and the transcendental functioning of the mind which determines, prior to experience, the ontological order of the world. Ricoeur suggests that new metaphorical meaning is achieved as a result of the tension between creative and claim-making discourses where the operation of the latter proceeds ‘from the very structures of the mind, which it is the task of transcendental philosophy to articulate’ (1978a: 300).

The appeals to ontology are made by Hausman and Ricoeur in order to overcome a paradox. The paradox is that, on their interactionist understanding of the trope, a strong metaphor creates a meaning which is in some way objective or truthful, yet this meaning is new, which is to say that, prior to the metaphor, the independent subject terms could neither suggest the new meaning nor signify the concepts which would support it. If the meaning is new, what is it that supplies the feeling of appropriateness?

The relation between metaphor and Kant is not merely the product of a coincidence of reference in the two scholars’ work. The phenomenon of inventive metaphor is a concentration of the problem faced by Kant in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1929). One of
the premises adopted by Kant is that experience, to be experience, must be experience which belongs to a subject. From this premise, he attempts to determine the principles of organization which the subject must apply a priori in order for intelligible experience to be possible. The problem to which this arrangement gives rise, however, is how to secure objectivity given the investment of the possibility of experience within the subject. Kant does not want to assert that the mind creates its own, subjective reality, but that it merely supplies the conditions which enable experience of an objective reality to be possible. He has somehow to project himself out of his self-made subjective prison.

Heidegger is relevant here. His contribution is to suggest ways in which structures already present in the *Critique* allow Kant to confirm the objectivity of experience (1962b). Kant asks how it is possible for *empirical* intuitions to be subsumed under pure, *ontological* concepts, and introduces the notion of a schema as the mediating condition (1929: A 137-8, B 176-7). Unfortunately, the manner in which a schema reconciles the two natures is not clearly defined and, ultimately, Kant dismisses the possibility of their subsumption as ‘an art concealed in the depths of the human soul’ (1929: A 141, B 180-1). I explicate Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant and, with supporting material from the *Critique*, show that what Kant perceived as an incongruity is in fact the tension in virtue of which the categories receive objective application. It is this tension between the ontological and the empirical, I argue, which consolidates both Ricoeur’s appeal to transcendental philosophy and Hausman’s notion of a *unique* metaphorical referent.

A third author, Kirk Pillow, has also recently turned to Kant to develop a theory of objective metaphor (2000). Pillow takes his lead from Ricoeur and, in particular, the position assigned to Kant’s doctrine of aesthetic ideas within Ricoeur’s theory. Although Pillow addresses questions in Kant’s epistemology and aesthetics, he does not approach metaphor through the creation–discovery paradox, as Ricoeur and Hausman do, and so I shall not dwell on his account here. However, I shall refer to it at the end of this chapter to indicate how I think it compares with the ontology I extract from Heidegger’s Kant.
INTERACTIONISM IN HAUSMAN AND RICOEUR

Both Hausman and Ricoeur work from the perspective of the interactionist theory of metaphor developed by Black (1962, 1979). In contrast to the comparison theory, which asserts that a metaphor simply makes explicit what was already implicit, interactionism promotes the creativity of metaphor by stressing the trilogistic nature of the trope. A metaphorical expression is made up of two subjects: (in Black’s idiom) the primary subject, the word used literally, and the secondary subject, the word used nonliterally. The third element which completes the metaphor is the interaction which occurs between the two subjects. (The rival, comparison theory does not acknowledge this third element. Rather, it presents metaphor as a condensed simile and claims that the significance of a trope can be explicated by listing the ways in which its subject terms are alike.)

Central to the interactionist account is the idea that interaction provides the condition for a meaning which neither of the subject terms possesses independently of the metaphorical context. The primary subject is coloured by a set of ‘associated implications’ normally predicated of the secondary subject (Black 1979: 28). From the number of possible meanings which could result, the primary subject sieves the qualities predicatable of the secondary subject, letting through only those that fit. The interaction, as a process, brings into being what Black terms an ‘implication-complex’ (1979: 29), a system of associated implications shared by the linguistic community as well as (or so Hausman thinks) an impulse of free meaning, free in that it is meaning which was unavailable prior to the metaphor’s introduction (Hausman 1989: 82-83). Somehow, interaction admits a meaning that is not already deducible from or present in the lexicon of a community.

Interactionism proposes to explain how metaphors create new significance rather than merely discover significance latent within a system of predetermined meanings. The question which Hausman wants to answer is how the meaning created by metaphor can be significant. If metaphors create meaning which is significant, what is it that makes it
so? What allows metaphor to be more than the attempt to strain intelligibility from a seemingly nonsensical combination of subject terms? Hausman calls this predicament the paradox of creativity, and in order to reconcile the concepts of new yet significant meaning, he introduces the notion of a metaphorically created referent:

A metaphorical expression functions so that it creates its significance, thus providing new insight, through designating a unique, extralinguistic and extraconceptual referent that had no place in the intelligible world before the metaphor was articulated.

(1989: 94)

Uniqueness and extraconceptuality or extralinguisticality (the last two terms are synonymous for Hausman) are the two conditions which the referent of every creative metaphor must satisfy, and it is their conjunction in a single expression which gives metaphor its cognitive value:

Uniqueness is necessary to the idea that the referent of a creative metaphor is new and individual. Extralinguisticality is necessary to justify saying that a creative metaphor is *appropriate or faithful or fits the world...* [And] it is the joining of these two conditions that is special to metaphors. There is something to which the expression is appropriate, some resistant or constraining condition: yet this condition is new.

(1989: 94)

Whereas Black presents the meaning of metaphor as a complex of associations, i.e. the exchange or interaction between them, Hausman wants to theorize this process as an object, a unique, objective referent. The metaphor “Juliet is the sun” can serve as an example (Hausman 1989: 103). Both the referents of the primary and secondary subjects are familiar; ‘Juliet’ and ‘the sun’ each have a straightforward meaning which is understood prior to the metaphor. The effect of the metaphor though is not, as Black would have it, to colour ‘Juliet’ with some of the relevant associations from ‘the sun’; neither is it simply to admit that Juliet shares certain qualities with the sun, such as
Radiance, brilliance, the fact that she makes the day or that she gets up every morning. Rather, Hausman extends Black’s account so that the senses of both subjects interact not only to create a new meaning but also to create a new referent. In short, a brand new signification is injected into the reader’s cognitive awareness. The expression’s meaning does not remain as a complex of associated implications but comes to fruition as a particular, intentional object. The referent carries the feeling of there being something more which gives the expression its cognitive value.

There is some ambiguity though in Hausman’s account concerning the precise nature of the extraconceptual object. It wavers from being something there, actual but unknowable, to being a conceptual provision posited to exceed the limitations of a linguistic community. To label these extremes, we can say that the status of the extraconceptual condition is either material or verbal respectively. The discord is contained by the question of whether or not the ‘extra’ refers (materially) to another realm or (verbally) to something more than is conceptually available at the time. At some points, Hausman says of the condition that it ‘adds an ontological dimension to the uniqueness’ condition (1989: 107). Similarly, extraconceptual objects are said to ‘constitute a dynamic, evolving world’ (1989: 117). ‘Extraconceptuality is necessary to justify saying that a creative metaphor is appropriate or faithful or fits the world’ (1989: 94). However, these admissions of material status are all countermanded by Hausman assigning verbal status to the condition. ‘What the extraconceptual condition adds to uniqueness’, he claims, ‘is not substantiality but, rather, a controlling factor, a locus for the senses... Its function is to constrain certain senses and resist others’ (1989: 108, my emphasis). Extraconceptual objects, he continues, ‘are intelligible complexes of meaning which gain extraconceptuality’ by offering resistance or constraint (1989: 193, my emphasis).

Hausman inadvertently brings Kant’s thing in itself to mind by explicitly denying that it has anything to do with his extraconceptual object. He disassociates his theory from transcendental idealism on the grounds that the thing in itself is an unknowable existent which cannot possibly ‘bear a direct, dynamic relation’ to the world (1989: 186). The difference between the two concepts, as Hausman sees it, is that extraconceptuality,
unlike the thing in itself, plays an active role in determining its knowable counterpart; it represents the way in which new, extralinguistic experiences are created by existent meanings drawn from the conceptual repertoire of the linguistic community. If language did not open onto these events then the collective awareness of the community would be limited to the arbitrary associations of the idealist. Hausman takes the irremovable presence of a mind-independent world, there each time we open our eyes, as evidence of this condition (1989: 216). Other examples which he suggests amplify the required sense are the counterpressure we experience upon lifting an object and our surprise at a sudden clap of thunder. The inescapable or unpredictable nature of the metaphorical referent cannot be consumed, but this, Hausman maintains, does not entitle us to dismiss it as a thing in itself, unknowable and unintelligible.

My claim is that extraconceptuality and all the ontological difficulties which come with it (as distinct from an ontological perspective *per se*) are unnecessary for a definition of his metaphorical referent. Hausman’s intention is to give an account which resolves the paradox of metaphor. For him, the thing in itself is definitely a material consideration: something which is there in a realm of some description but which is unknowable because it is never directly encountered in experience. However, I submit that if he had been aware of the noumenon’s more defensible role as a limiting concept in Kant’s critical system, he could have fulfilled his intention and successfully defined the metaphorical referent solely in terms of the uniqueness condition. Just how Kant’s epistemology assists Hausman’s project I shall discuss later.

Ricoeur in actual fact anticipates Hausman’s creativity paradox. In *The Rule of Metaphor*, Ricoeur asks:

> Does not the fittingness [of metaphor]… indicate that language not only has organized reality in a different way, but also made manifest a way of being of things, which is brought to language thanks to semantic innovation? It would seem that the enigma of metaphorical discourse is that it ‘invents’ in both senses of the word: what it creates, it discovers; and what it finds, it invents.
Ricoeur introduces the notion of intersecting discourses to explain the ‘enigmatic’
production of new yet appropriate metaphorical meaning. He avers that metaphor is
the result of the interaction between metaphorical and speculative discourse.
Metaphorical discourse is the domain in which new expressions are created but not
conceptualized or translated; it is where inventive metaphors receive their first outing.²
The combinations of subjects which take place in metaphorical discourse are *diaphoric*
(to use Aristotle’s term) in the sense that they are unprecedented and unresolved
(Aristotle 1996: 34-38).³ Instances of the discourse might be a poem, a narrative or an
essay. Speculative discourse is the domain of the concept and, furthermore, the domain
in which the concept can be predicated of an object. It is this discourse which focuses
the play of meanings thrown up by metaphor into a proposition which revivifies our
perception of the world. To adopt Aristotle’s contrast term, speculative discourse is
*epiphoric* in that it combines subjects on the basis of rational, explicable similarity. As
intersecting discourses, the metaphorical creates the utterance ‘A is B’ together with all
the ‘nonsensical’ possibilities that it implies, and through its encounter with the
speculative, the play of possibilities is resolved and A’s B-like nature is conceptualized.

The importance of the productive tension between metaphorical and speculative
discourse for Ricoeur cannot be overstated. Metaphor ‘is living’, he proclaims, ‘by
virtue of the fact that it [metaphorically] introduces the spark of imagination into a
“thinking more” at the conceptual [speculative] level’ (1978a: 303). ‘My inclination’, he
writes,

> is to see the universe of discourse as a universe kept in motion by an
> interplay of attractions and repulsions that ceaselessly promote the
> interaction and intersection of domains whose organizing nuclei are off-
> centred in relation to one another.

(1978a: 302)
However, despite this stress on interplay, speculative discourse is shown to be the principal element in Ricoeur’s theory, since it is the mode of discourse which resolves the ‘nonsensical’ possibilities of the metaphorical ‘$A$ is $B$’ into appropriate, worldly meaning; that is to say, it is the speculative which assigns metaphor its ‘ontological vehemence’ (1978a: 300). The interpretation of metaphor, he adds, ‘is the work of concepts’ and ‘consequently a struggle for univocity’ (1978a: 302). Possibly because of its elementary status though, speculative discourse is the component whose origin is explained the least satisfactorily. We are told that it proceeds ‘from the very structures of the mind, which it is the task of transcendental philosophy to articulate’ (1978a: 300), and Ricoeur seeks to explain it through comparison with Kant’s doctrine of aesthetic ideas. Kant defines an aesthetic idea as ‘a presentation of the imagination which prompts much thought, but to which no determinate thought whatsoever, i.e. no [determinate] concept, can be adequate, so that no language can express it completely and allow us to grasp it’ (Kant 1987: 314). The production of aesthetic ideas forms part of Kant’s account of the genius of the artist in giving expression to rational ideas, concepts to which no sensory object or experience can correspond, such as the concepts of God and justice (I provide a detailed analysis of this aspect of Kant’s aesthetics in the next chapter). As such, one could be led into thinking that Ricoeur’s reference to aesthetic ideas is intended to demonstrate how the speculative within metaphor is capable of exceeding conventional thought. However, while he holds that metaphor in general does this, it is not the reason why he appeals to Kant’s transcendental philosophy.

What Ricoeur wants from aesthetic ideas is not the artistic capacity to exceed thought – this, in Ricoeur’s analysis, falls within metaphorical discourse; it is speculative discourse that we are dealing with here – but the capacity to exceed thought objectively. Aesthetic ideas strive to grant objectivity to rational concepts; in Kant’s words, they ‘try to approach an exhibition of rational concepts… [and thereby give them] a semblance of objective reality’ (1987: 314). Exhibition provides intuitions for concepts, demonstrates that concepts are not empty but adequate for cognition (Kant 1987: 314). All exhibition, Kant announces, ‘consists in making [a concept] sensible, and is either schematic or symbolic’ (1987: 351). It is schematic exhibition that is important for Ricoeur. (Symbolic exhibition is not relevant here because, in Kant’s words, it ‘is an expedient
we use for concepts of the supersensible, which as such cannot actually be... given in any possible experience’ (1987: 351, n. 31). A concept is schematically exhibited when an intuition corresponds to it, that is, when an object is brought under a concept and judged to be of a certain kind. Explicating this process, Ricoeur thinks, will help to explain the objective ‘thinking more’ which speculative discourse carries out when it intersects with metaphorical discourse. He reaffirms the importance of the schematism in his essay ‘The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination and Feeling’ (Ricoeur 1978b):

I want to underscore a trait of predicative assimilation which may support my contention that the rapprochement [between heterogeneous ideas] characteristic of the metaphorical process offers a typical kinship to Kant’s schematism. I mean the paradoxical character of the predicative assimilation which has been compared by some authors to Ryle’s concept of ‘category mistake’, which consists in presenting the facts pertaining to one category in the terms appropriate to another.

(1978b: 146)

However, Kant’s schematism is by no means unproblematic, and so the manner in which it informs the assimilation of heterogeneous ideas in a metaphor cannot be taken as self-evident. Unfortunately, the nature of this ‘kinship’ is not made explicit by Ricoeur. Nevertheless, the full relevance of the schematism, I suggest, can be brought out by examining Heidegger’s retrieval of Kant’s ‘Transcendental Analytic’. As I shall show, both the emphasis on possibility and the importance of the schematism which emerge from Heidegger’s study support Ricoeur’s treatment of metaphor.

THE CREATION OF OBJECTIVITY IN HEIDEGGER’S KANT

Kant asks in the first Critique how it is possible for empirical intuitions to be subsumed under pure, ontological concepts. This difference in kind between the ontological and the empirical is, in Heidegger’s opinion, the Copernican Revolution condensed into one
moment. Heidegger contests the traditional interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* as being an enquiry into the conditions of the possibility of knowledge; the work, he claims, ‘has nothing to do with a “theory of knowledge”’ (Heidegger 1962b: 21). If the *Critique* does contain any positive, theoretical import, then, he thinks, it is towards evincing the conditions of the possibility of knowledge. Given that experience is always already occupied with empirical objects, its principles of organization must be logically prior to experience; it is the conditions of the possibility of knowledge of these a priori principles which, according to Heidegger, Kant seeks.

To develop the notion that it is the subject which organizes experience, Kant introduces the binary model of concepts interpreting intuitions (1929: A19, B33). The concept–intuition relation, I suggest, is primarily an acknowledgment of the finitude of human cognition: it serves as a model to demonstrate that experience must always be in receipt of an object. Ontic or empirical knowledge, in Kant’s presentation of it, arises through the unproblematic subsumption of empirical intuitions under empirical concepts. However, ‘what makes the relation to the essent (ontic knowledge) possible’, Heidegger observes, ‘is the precursory comprehension of the constitution of the Being of the essent, namely, ontological knowledge’ (1962b: 15). Churchill follows Manheim in translating Heidegger’s *Seiend* as ‘essent’. It refers to any item in the world which can be discussed without a commitment to any particular epistemological and ontological framework, whereas ‘object’ refers specifically to an item the knowledge and ontological nature of which is being considered in relation to the finitude of human cognition. Reason must somehow ‘look ahead’ of experience and determine in advance the ontological nature of the essent, its quiddity (*Wasgebalt*) or what-ness (*Wassein*), so that conceptualization has something to aim for. The essent can only be represented in intuition as an object with the determination necessary to promote conceptualization if the ontological nature of the essent is projected in advance by pure reason.

For Heidegger, then, the *Critique of Pure Reason* is an enquiry into the possibility of ontology. Ontological knowledge is the ontological nature of the essent which determines its offering-character (*Angebotscharakter*), its capacity to be represented in
intuition as an object. It is not knowledge in the traditional sense: it tells us nothing about the object in itself but, rather, simply represents how the essent must be determined by pure reason for it to be represented by intuition within human finitude. The problem with this arrangement is the central concern of this paper in Kantian form: precisely how is the essent able to manifest itself as an object within finite experience prior to its being represented in intuition, that is, how is ontological knowledge possible? How is it possible for an operation (experience for Kant and metaphor for Hausman and Ricoeur) to acquire objectivity given its basis in subjectivity? For Kant, the objectivity of experience is supposedly guaranteed by the finitude of experience, but his main problem is the justification of the possibility of finitude. Ultimately, the material source of objectivity, for Kant, will be empirical intuition, but this is only after it has been determined by the pure concepts of the understanding. Empirical intuition will only be the objective representation of an object if there is ontological knowledge in advance of it which can ‘produce’ an object, i.e. establish the conditions which allow an object to appear before consciousness.

The principles supplied by the subject which structure experience are the categories or the pure concepts of the understanding. The pure concepts are contentless: they merely represent how the mind is active in ontologically determining the object of experience so that it can be represented in empirical intuition. But, Kant wonders, how can something without content (a pure concept) correspond with something which has content (an empirical intuition)?

In all subsumptions of an object under a concept the representation of the object must be homogeneous with the concept; in other words, the concept must contain something which is represented in the object that is to be subsumed under it...

But pure concepts of understanding being quite heterogeneous from empirical intuitions... can never be met with in any intuition. For no one will say that a category, such as that of causality, can be intuited through sense and is itself contained in appearance. How, then, is the
subsumption of intuitions under pure concepts, the application of a category to appearances, possible?

(1929: A 137-8, B 176-7)

‘Obviously’, Kant reasons, ‘there must be some third thing, which is homogeneous on the one hand with the category, and on the other hand with the appearance [empirical intuition], and which thus makes the application of the former to the latter possible’ (1929: A 138, B 177). The third thing which Kant introduces is a ‘schema’: a transcendental determination of time which brings a category into line with intuition by presenting an ‘image’ for the category. Kant provides three illustrations of how his notion of ‘image’ is to be conceived, as well as individual accounts of each category’s relation to time (1929: A 140-1, B 179-80). I shall quote just the first illustration. While the concept of a small number such as ‘five’ can be represented by the image ‘…’, the concept of a large number, Kant asserts, cannot be pictured so easily. The thought of a large number in general is

the representation of a method whereby a multiplicity, for instance a thousand, may be represented in an image in conformity with a certain concept, [rather] than the image itself. For with such a number as a thousand the image can hardly be surveyed and compared with the concept. This representation of a universal procedure of imagination in providing an image for a concept, I entitle the schema of this concept.

(1929: A140, B179-80)

Taking this and Kant’s additional illustrations into account, the salient point would seem to be that, in trying to understand the notion of a schema, we should think more in terms of a method of representation rather than a single representation, since no individual image can realize the universality of a concept. Yet this recommendation does not go very far towards clarifying how mediation between ontological concepts and empirical intuition occurs. The unaccompanied notion of an image, Heidegger avers, leaves unaddressed the difficulty that ‘a concept as a represented universal may not be represented by a representatio singularis, which is what an intuition always is. That
is why a concept by its very essence cannot be put into an image’ (1962b: 99). Kant too is aware that his account is not entirely satisfactory, for directly after his last illustration of an image comes the infamous admission that ‘this schematism of our understanding, in its application to appearances and their mere form, is an art concealed in the depths of the human soul, whose real modes of activity nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover, and to have open to our gaze’ (1929: A 141, B 180-1). All that he can assert is that a schema is ‘a product and, as it were, a monogram, of pure a priori imagination, through which, and in accordance with which, images themselves first become possible’ (1929: A 142, B 181).

The basic move which Heidegger makes to salvage Kant’s notion of a schema, and thereby to retrieve the critical project, is to emphasize the significance of time in the Critique. In retrieving the schematism, Heidegger essentially demonstrates how Kant’s notion of the transcendental object, used by Kant to establish the unity of consciousness, may also be represented as part of a ‘temporal action’ which is itself constitutive of objectivity. Components of this demonstration are a revision of the understanding of time – from empirical to primordial time – as the pure form of intuition, and an emphasis of the significance of the relation between the transcendental object and primordial time.

Kant employs the concept ‘intuition’ to acknowledge that consciousness is always in receipt of an object; empirical intuition is receptive or, one could say, receptivity itself. Time is the form of intuition or pure intuition, the field or opening in which inner representations may occur, and as such, Heidegger avers, is not receptive but productive; time, he claims, is constitutive of the possibility of receptivity. This is time understood not empirically, as a succession of ‘nows’, but primordially, ‘as that which lets time as the now-sequence spring forth’ (1962b: 181). The paradigm of an act of perception, receiving something which is present in a single now, overlooks the consideration that a single now could never be intuited: each now, Heidegger argues, has ‘an essentially continuous extension in a just passing and just coming [Soeben und Sogleich]... Pure intuition must in itself give the aspect of the now in such a way that it looks ahead to the just coming and back to the just passing’ (1962b: 179).
For Kant, it is the transcendental object which confers the unity of consciousness upon a ‘series’ of representations that would otherwise be unconnected ‘nows’. However, while this confirms the necessity of the application of the categories to experience, it does not confirm their objective validity. The validity Kant seeks is a matter of justifying the necessity of their application to experience. The model of knowledge whereby a form is imposed upon matter is not being proposed here: an object, Kant insists, is not produced for a concept ‘in so far as existence is concerned’; this is not objectification ‘by means of the will’ (1929: A 92, B 125). Neither can recourse be made to the deducibility of the categories from experience, as exercised by Locke and Hume, because ‘on any such exposition they would be merely accidental’ (1929: B 126). We postulate the empirical rule of association whenever we cite a relation between objects or events as rule-governed, universal, objective, or more than accidental, but how is this association possible?

The objectivity of the categories, Heidegger declares, is ‘formed’ by schemata, as transcendental determinations of time, primordially creating a transcendental object for them. Primordial time itself is nothing more than the movement whereby an object is proposed for consciousness; it is the original bifurcation of the distinction between subject and object. Heidegger justifies his ‘radical interpretation’ by offering an explication of primordial time which parallels Kant’s account of synthesis (1962b: 181). Primordial time is not unidirectional but prospective and retrospective. Pure intuition, he writes, ‘can form the pure succession of the now-sequence only if, in itself, it is imagination, as that which forms, reproduces, and anticipates’ (1962b: 180).

Corresponding to the stages of apprehension, reproduction and recognition, primordial time is the ‘looking ahead’, the ‘holding on’ and the ‘looking back’ to an object which creates the unity necessary for any sense of the empirical succession of nows. Time, Heidegger writes, ‘is that in general which forms something on the order of a line of orientation which going from the self is directed toward... in such a way that the objective thus constituted springs forth and surges back along this line’ (1962b: 194, original ellipsis). This line is perhaps best pictured as a circle: the original burgeoning forth of the proposition of an object, the pulling round as the object is held in the
present, and then the pulling back towards the self as the object’s passing away completes the process of succession.

The relation between time and the transcendental object is important. The transcendental object or ‘object in general’, Heidegger asserts, is not a thing, an essent, something which can be reported in intuition, but a horizon of objectivity, the proposition of an opposition which opens up the possibility of intuition and, therefore, which represents the ontological distinction between mind and reality. What lies before the horizon, so to speak, is the space in which the content of experience may appear, and this space is primordially temporal: the transcendental object is the act of looking forward to and holding on to; looking forward to and holding on to are the anticipation and retention of a something in general. Experience, Heidegger affirms, ‘is an act of receptive intuition which must let the essent be given’ (1962b: 122), but in order for an object to be capable of being given in intuition, there must in advance be ontological knowledge: the ‘orientation toward that which is capable of being “called up”’ (1962b: 122; my emphasis).

OBJECTIVITY AND POSSIBILITY IN HEIDEGGER, HAUSMAN AND RICOEUR

At this stage, we can begin to draw together Heidegger’s Kant and the two theories of metaphor I outlined above. The role played by the transcendental object in the schematism is the best analogue to display the correspondence between Kant, Hausman and Ricoeur. The action common to all three philosophemes – the transcendental object, the metaphorical referent, and speculative discourse – is the creation of the notion of a ‘something’ about which judgment can be made; they are all nominalizations of the point where predication meets ontology. An empirical concept is a concept of a particular object, e.g. a tree, a house, a mountain, whereas the Kantian category, as a pure concept, is a concept of an object in general, which amounts to saying it is a concept of the predicative relation. The identification of ‘object in general’ and predication is justified, Kant writes, by the recognition that ‘the function of
categorical judgment is that of the relation of subject to predicate’ (1929: B 128). The
categories, Kant writes, are ‘concepts of an object in general, by means of which the
intuition of an object is regarded as determined in respect of one of the logical
functions of judgment’ (1929: B 128) and whose division is ‘developed systematically
from... the faculty of judgment’ (1929: A 80-1, B 106). The imagination produces an
object for a category not in the sense that it manufactures a tree or a mountain but in
that it creates the original divide between subject and object, and thereby allows
intuition to appear opposite consciousness.

The same concern to create an object for judgment occupies Hausman and Ricoeur.
Hausman seeks to explain the objectivity of metaphor by introducing the notion of a
metaphorical referent. One of the defining conditions of a referent is uniqueness. The
condition is modelled on Peirce’s notion of an ‘immediate object’: the interpretive
process through which a speaker is able to formulate a declarative sentence from a list
of abstract qualities, for example, to transform the qualities redness, largeness, and what
it is to be a rose, into the judgment ‘This red rose is large’ (Hausman 1989: 209-23). The
condition, for Hausman, serves to ensure that the meaning of a metaphor derives not
from a complex of associated implications but from the fact that it identifies a new,
unique individual. For example, the novelty and significance of the metaphor ‘the
chanting of the cars’ is explained not simply by the interaction of the associations
connected with chanting and cars, but by the notion that the metaphor refers to a state,
a thing, an object in the world.

Ricoeur conceives metaphor as the intersection of two discourses: the metaphorical and
the speculative. The latter is the epiphoric, predicative element which endeavours to
assimilate the heterogeneous subjects combined in the former. The speculative provides
the recognition that a proposition is always about something and draws out a claim
from an otherwise diaphoric combination of terms. Although a seemingly nonsensical
pairing of words, it is the fact that a metaphor is a proposition, that it has an object,
that it has ‘ontological vehemence’, which grants the trope its cognitive value (Ricoeur
1978a: 299-300). Thus, Ricoeur’s claim that the necessity of speculative discourse
proceeds ‘from the very structures of the mind, which it is the task of transcendental
philosophy to articulate’ could be taken as a reference to the production of a transcendental object, a ‘something’ upon which the heterogeneous subjects in metaphorical discourse are focused (1978a: 300).

The emphasis on ‘producing an object’ though does little to justify how Kant, Hausman or Ricoeur can talk in terms of objectivity. The arrangement whereby intuitions are subsumed under categories in virtue of the creation of a temporal horizon has, I feel, to a large extent, the same formulaic quality as that provided by Kant to elucidate the subjective unity of consciousness. Like the notion of the unity afforded by the concept of an object, the notion of a space in which an essent may manifest itself is a wholly general one, that is, it would seem not to discriminate between what can and cannot be an object, what is and is not appropriate, what is objective and what is random. Furthermore, Hausman’s notion of a metaphorical referent and Ricoeur’s predicative dialectic of epiphor and diaphor would seem to be just as formulaic: neither confronts the fact that the impact of a metaphor is tied to the experience and understanding of the particular subjects which feature in it.

However, the notion of a temporal horizon only appears to exhibit an unsatisfactory generality in the face of empirical intuition because the ontological is confused with the empirical. The transcendental object is not the idealized notion of an essent existing in a specious present but the proposition of an opposition which opens up the possibility of receptivity. ‘Possibility’ here does not signify the question of whether or not an essent will appear but, rather, affirms the contingency with which all essents appear to consciousness. It is, Kant affirms, the possibility of experience which ‘gives objective reality to all our a priori modes of knowledge’ (1929: A 156, B 195). The expression ‘possibility of experience’, Heidegger reminds us, refers ‘to that which makes finite experience possible, i.e. experience which is not necessarily but contingently real’ (1962b: 121). The objectivity of the empirical is that things may appear otherwise than they do. The essent is not a particularity apprehended in a single now but something which may be this or may be that, something whose nature can never be exhausted by conceptualization. Heidegger provides an illustration. ‘In what way’, he asks,
does the aspect of [a particular] house reveal the how of the appearance of a house in general? The house itself, indeed, presents a definite aspect. But we do not have to lose ourselves in this particular house in order to know exactly how it appears. On the contrary, this particular house is revealed as such that, in order to be a house, it need not necessarily appear as, in fact, it does appear. It reveals to us ‘only’ the ‘how’ of the possible appearance of a house.

(1962b: 99)

It is the notion of something existing in the particular which is under revision here. A particular house is only a particular house because it could have appeared otherwise, that is, as another particular house. This is not the point that a particular house is only this house and not another because it is just one member of the class of houses; this point only sustains the universal–particular divide. Rather, the point is that the appearance of a particular house is not the ‘what’ but the ‘how’ of the possible appearance of a house. A particular house is not a particular house at all but (only) a possible one.

The element which needs to be examined is what it is that delimits the scope of possible modes of appearance or, as Heidegger puts it, ‘what regulates and determines how... something must appear in order be able... to present an aspect corresponding to its nature’ (1962b: 100). ‘Aspect’ here is synonymous with ‘image’ (the identification is made by Heidegger at 1962b: 102). The recommendation is that a representation predetermines the essent such that it (the representation) presents an aspect which is a possible aspect for the essent’s nature (1962b: 100). Predetermination will occur precisely with a view to the essent presenting a possible empirical aspect:

This predetermination of the rule [concept] is not a description which simply enumerates the ‘characteristics’ which one finds in a house but is a ‘distinguishing characteristic’ [Auszeichnen] of the whole of that which is intended by ‘house’.
But what is thus intended can, in general, be so intended only if it is represented as something which regulates the possible insertion of this complex [the house] into an empirical aspect.

(1962b: 100)

Cropping this quotation makes its claim explicit: the predetermination of the concept is a ‘distinguishing characteristic’ of the whole of that which is intended by the concept and which can be so intended only if it is represented as something which regulates the possible insertion of the essent into an empirical aspect. Predetermination is thus a ‘distinguishing characteristic’ of the concept. Heidegger refers to this predetermination within the concept as ‘conceptual representation’. If, he continues,

a concept is that which serves as a rule, then conceptual representation is the supplying, in advance, of the rule insofar as it [conceptual representation] provides an aspect corresponding to the specific way in which it [determines]. Such a representation is referred by a structural necessity to a possible aspect and hence is in itself a particular mode of sensibilization.

(1962b: 100; my emphasis)

The unifying action of a concept, that is, its application to many is only evident, in Heidegger’s words, as ‘the representation of the way in which the [concept-as-] rule prescribes the insertion of [the] pattern [of the essent] into a possible aspect’ (1962b: 100; my emphasis).

It is this representation of how the concept prescribes which is the schema of the concept. Kant maintains that a pure concept can be sensibilized by a schema producing an image for it. A concept, by structural, schematic necessity, always refers to a possible image. ‘Schema’ and ‘image’ emerge from this example as the affirmation, by Kant, that a concept is the presentation of a possible aspect: the schema is the necessarily ‘offering’ side of the concept and the image is the possible aspect offered. The image though is not a singular representation, a particular aspect, but the tension between the
ontological and the empirical nominalized as a mediating notion: it is the possibility of
the aspect, that is to say (in Heidegger’s words), it is the ‘possibility itself, [and] not [for
example] the isolated aspect of a multiplicity of points’ (1962b: 105). A concept can
never be considered distinct from the offering of a possible image. It is this
understanding which prompts Heidegger’s comment that ‘what in logic is termed a
concept is based upon the schema’ (1962b: 103, my emphasis). The concept is in fact part
of, the middle term within, the relation between schema and image.9

With this recognition of the structural relation between schema and image, the sense of
the three illustrations given by Kant becomes apparent (1929: A 140-1, B 179-80). In
the first illustration, quoted above, he likens the ‘universal procedure of the imagination
in providing an image for a concept’ to ‘the thought of a large number in general’, for
with such a number ‘the image can hardly be surveyed and compared with the concept’
(1929: A140, B179-80). The thought of a large number in general, he claims, rather than
being the image of a particular number, is ‘the representation of a method whereby a
multiplicity, for instance a thousand, may be represented in an image in conformity
with a certain concept’ (1929: A 140, B 179, my emphasis). In the third illustration, he
affirms that neither an object of experience nor its image is

...ever adequate to the empirical concept; for this latter always stands in
immediate relation to the schema of imagination, as a rule for the
determination of our intuition, in accordance with some specific universal
concept. The concept ‘dog’ signifies a rule according to which my
imagination can delineate the figure of a four-footed animal in a general
manner, without limitation to any single determinate figure such as
experience, or any possible image that I can represent in concreto, actually
presents.

(1929: A 141, B 180)

The inadequacy of the image to the concept, Heidegger declares, is to be considered a
virtue of the relation. It is only by being inadequate to an empirical concept that the
image or aspect of the object can be a possible aspect. The one–many distinction is a
virtue because the one admits of many possible applications. The original general–particular relation between concept and object which regarded the incongruity between terms to be a difficulty for their conjunction is here replaced by a relation in which incongruity is the enabling condition. The particular object in any conceptual representation, Heidegger explains,

has renounced the possibility of being just anything and, by this means, has become a possible example for the one which regulates the indifferent many. In this act of regulation, however, the general acquires its own specifically articulated determination and is in no way to be contrasted with the particular as being an indeterminate and confused ‘everything and anything’.

(1962b: 103)

The object’s status as a possible object in relation to its concept also forestalls any charge of formularity which may be made against Hausman or Ricoeur. The objectivity of a metaphor, for Ricoeur, derives from its primary subject being a component in a play of meaning which entertains the actualities and potentialities introduced by novel predication. Speculative discourse, present in both literal and metaphorical predication, is the production of an object for judgment. The creation of an object admits objectivity not through simply accepting any empirical content as an object, but through being the horizon before which and in virtue of which possible contents may appear. The meaning of a metaphor can be significant, and not just flat or nonsensical, precisely because no single, autonomous image or representation is described by the metaphor. Its diaphoric pairing of terms impels the reader to find new ways of relating subject and predicate and, thus, to bring the ‘odyssey’ of actuality and potentiality into play (Ricoeur 1978a: 298).

It is the unification of category and intuition through an ontology of possibility which Ricoeur adopts and identifies with the metaphorical process of comparison between incompatible realms. The claim which is useful to him is that the so-called generality of the concept exists not ‘in itself’ but in the exercise of its ‘regulative function’. The
concept’s circumscription of an object is not the bringing-into-relation of two autonomous contents but the schematic predetermination of a possible image. The idea that the concept delimits a general kind to which there corresponds an autonomous representation is engendered by habitual patterns of seeing and is the assumption, with its commitment to belonging and literal appropriateness, which makes metaphorical objectivity seem such a conundrum.

The significance of the schematism for Hausman’s explanation of metaphor is not so straightforward. As we have seen, the definitions he gives of a metaphor’s extraconceptual referent are equivocal, shifting from being something materially present in the world, actual but unknowable, to being a conceptual provision posited to exceed the limitations of a linguistic community. However, some progress can be made if we concentrate upon what Hausman sets out to achieve with his extraconceptual condition. Extraconceptuality is included as a defining condition of the metaphorical referent in order to make it a more worldly entity. It confirms that there is particularity or quiddity ‘in the world’ beyond language to which metaphor can be appropriate. ‘Constraints against embodying qualities that would [for example] constitute [the flower] as a tulip rather than as a rose’, he explains, ‘are more relevant to certain kinds of classification than are the constraints that affect [considerations of colour and size]’ (1989: 217). The objectivity he wishes to convey, I suggest, is that expressed by Ricoeur in his account of the dialectic between sense and reference (1978a: 297-8). There is a reciprocity between acquiring new words and individuating new features of reality, Ricoeur argues, which enables us to relate new predicates to familiar referents and relate familiar predicates to an unknown referential field. It is the fact that a state of enablement exists between the two, that both domains are articulate and allow distinctions to be made within themselves, which corresponds to Hausman’s notion of appropriate description. The difficulty Hausman encounters with extraconceptuality is caused by the category mistake he makes with the condition. He cites it to be a property of the referent when it is actually a function of the exchange between description and the object (1989: 94).
However, his uniqueness condition, I maintain, exhibits the same predicative structure as the transcendental object and, through this comparison, can be shown to explain the possibility of objective description independent of any reference to extraconceptuality. The possibility of objective description, I propose, is reflected in Kant’s transforming the notion of a particular object into that of a possible object. Hausman’s uniqueness condition is the interpretive process which allows a speaker to focus abstract qualities as the description of a particular. Yet, as we have seen, the particular object only exhibits its particularity against the possibility of the other appearances it could have presented. The state of enablement whereby concepts can be applied to the world follows not from the comparability of singular representations but from the possibility that an object may be apprehended in different ways, for it is only against the backdrop of the differences in salient features that Hausman’s criterion of appropriate description can obtain. His uniqueness condition, therefore, already includes extraconceptuality as a necessary component, for it, like the transcendental object, is the projection of an object in general which entertains the particular wholly in virtue of the other, alternative appearances that empirical experience supplies.

**Pillow’s Kantian Theory of Metaphor**

As I announced at the start of the chapter, Kant is also made the basis of a theory of objective metaphor by Pillow (2000). Pillow develops Ricoeur’s reference to Kant’s doctrine of aesthetic ideas (1978a: 303). Kant’s aesthetic ideas lend themselves to a theory of objective metaphor, Ricoeur suggests, because they are presentations ‘by the imagination that [force] conceptual thought to think more’, where the ‘thinking more’ corresponds to the claim that metaphor goes beyond pre-existent similarities to create new ones (1978a: 303). To quote Kant’s definition again: an aesthetic idea is ‘a presentation of the imagination which prompts much thought, but to which no determinate thought whatsoever, i.e. no [determinate] concept, can be adequate, so that no language can express it completely and allow us to grasp it’ (Kant 1987: 314). What Pillow does from here is to locate this excess within judgments of the sublime, on the basis that the ‘language of the ineffable [from aesthetic ideas]… is redolent of the
Kant and Heidegger on the creation of objectivity 40

Kantian sublime’ (2000: 79), with the advantage, as he sees it, that ‘it avoids the temptation to force aesthetic ideas into taste’s limited compass’, as if ‘the judgment of taste [were] the only game in town’ (2000: 88-89). This move, I think, is questionable, and I shall return to it shortly.

For now, it is worth briefly examining Pillow’s trajectory, as an interesting parallel emerges between his account and mine. Having this ‘prompt to thought’, including metaphor, originate from sublime judgment as opposed to aesthetic judgment, Pillow argues, allows the prompt to do two things: (1) to serve cognition through generating the conceptual free-play necessary for determinate judgment to occur (also achievable through aesthetic judgment), but – and this is Pillow’s main claim – (2) to do so in such a way that, instead of only resulting in a concept being brought to intuition, an inexhaustible, open-ended and judgment-resistant network of connotations is produced. Sublime judgment or reflection, for Pillow, is ‘a special construal of Kantian reflective judgment’ which can be triggered by any encounter, not just a sublime one (2000: 5, 69). Its ‘judgment-resistance’ is described by Pillow as ‘the unpresentable, uncanny Other of the conventionally understood’, but, he insists, it is not wholly external or opposed to conventional, determinate judgment (2000: 303). Although a sublime experience has ‘a disrupting and a dehabituating effect on current categories, current ways of slicing up and threading together worlds’, the reflective judgment we exercise in response is nevertheless ‘an “ingenious” inventive power’ which ‘forges into the unpresentable Other of our conceptual store, in search of how else we might make sense of our shared worlds’ (2000: 5). He relates talk of ‘our shared worlds’ to the Kantian thesis of a mind-constructed world, but acknowledges the epistemological difficulty that arises for it, namely, the oscillation between the concepts of a mind-determined reality and a mind-independent reality (2000: 307). However, a way of jumping off the see-saw of mind-dependence and mind-independence is advanced by John McDowell, and Pillow adopts McDowell’s proposal as a means of determining the ontological status of his concept of sublime reflection.

It is here that Pillow’s account parallels mine, for although neither Pillow nor McDowell make systematic reference to Heidegger, McDowell’s philosophy
nevertheless shares a key principle with Heidegger’s ontology. McDowell’s position is based upon a ‘naturalized’ reading of Kant’s epistemology, where ‘naturalized’ embodies the claim that human cognitive faculties belong to the nature they access; we have just seen this in terms of the ontic subject and world emerging from shared ontological conditions of possibility. The idea that human cognition and nature overlap ontologically in some way is termed ‘second nature’ by McDowell (McDowell 1994: 84). This is a concept of nature, McDowell writes, that ‘does not exclude the intelligibility that belongs to meaning’, which is to say that it is a ‘realm of law’ whose lawfulness belongs to the same ‘space of reasons’ or space of concepts in which human thought operates (McDowell 1994: 72-74, 84-86). In eschewing the orthodox, Cartesian view which places thought on one side of a divide, and reality on the other, second nature provides an ontological space in which languages and traditions can be seen ‘as constitutive of our unproblematic openness to the world’ (McDowell 1994: 155, quoted in Pillow 2000: 308). This is the space, Pillow argues, in which sublime reflection, including metaphor, operates. Through its judgment-resistant network of connotations,

[sublime reflection] revises fields of shared meaning and so recasts the worlds they pattern, [with] the validity of its product [resting] on how astutely it manipulates the current practices of sense-making, and how well it communicates a compelling disclosure to those who sufficiently share the webs of connectivity it reworks.

(2000: 309)

For Pillow, the worlds are not alternative realities in a relativistic sense but ‘networks of meaning-giving connection’ which work against the cognitive impulse ‘to reduce complex and contextually shifting phenomena to fixed structures’ (2000: 305). Sublime reflection, he continues, ‘always awaits the revision of its tentative claims [or worlds], claims that in their very partiality spur on the search for other construals of purposive design’ (2000: 305). Pillow has in mind, I suggest, a thick, textured zone of never fully-realized world-construction which, in the context of Kant’s epistemology, generates the flux of possible worlds necessary for determinate judgment to intersect with reality, but in a fashion which has a sense of possibility or otherness endure to prevent determinate
judgment from reducing reality to a fixed structure. My description of Pillow’s sublime reflection in terms of the generation of possibility signals where I think his study lines up with mine (although ‘possibility’ is not a key term in his epistemology). Metaphor creates objective, insightful judgment from a Kantian perspective because, with Pillow, it embodies the sublime multiplication of worlds which brings a provisionality to cognition and, with my reading of Heidegger’s Kant, the subject of a metaphor manifests itself as a possible subject, as something that could appear otherwise than it does.

I have some reservations regarding Pillow’s theory though. While it cannot be denied that the sublime plays an important role in Kant’s theory of judgment, the work which Pillow tries to make it do is already being done by other elements within Kant’s system. As I outline above, Pillow asserts that the sublime contributes to Kant’s theory of judgment and, within this, that it creates an inexhaustible, open-ended and judgment-resistant network of connotations or worlds. But this is already accounted for by aesthetic ideas. An aesthetic idea, in Kant’s words, ‘prompts the imagination to spread over a multitude of kindred presentations that arouse more thought than can be expressed in a concept determined by words’ (Kant 1987: 315; emphases added). As I demonstrate in the next chapter, this ‘spreading over a multitude’ forms a resistance within reflective judgment which plays a positive, if not to say vital, role in the completion of Kant’s critical system.

Pillow overlooks this and introduces the sublime, I suggest, because he has a narrow view of the significance which judgments of taste (as opposed to judgments of the sublime) have for Kant. ‘My solution’, he declares,

has the advantage that it retains Kant’s formal judgment of taste as it stands. It avoids the temptation to force aesthetic ideas into taste’s limited compass, by locating interpretation of them in a separate sublime reflection.

(2000: 89, emphasis added)
Further evidence of Pillow’s narrow view of aesthetics comes in his criticism of Kantian scholarship’s concentration on the relation between cognition and judgments of taste. The standard approach to the question of how concepts stand with regard to aesthetic judgment, he maintains, is ‘to loosen up, to the point of all-inclusiveness, the array of elements that contribute to the harmony of cognitive powers in the judgment of taste’ (2000: 88, emphasis added). However, it is only from Pillow’s narrow perspective on the judgment of taste that it appears ‘loosened up’. The reason why he perceives taste as having such a ‘limited compass’, I think, is evident in his asking (albeit rhetorically) the following question: ‘how indeed can a pure aesthetic judgment that appears to have no truck with concepts or representations of affairs contribute to our reflection on the thematic material imparted by a work of art?’ (2000: 88). Aesthetic judgment differs from cognitive or determinate judgment in that it does not immediately bring an intuition under a concept. So Pillow is right to say that judgments of taste ‘have no truck with concepts’. However, it is the concept-less nature of aesthetic judgment that makes it the focus of Kant’s systematic account of our capacity to judge. As I explain in the next chapter, because judgment, by Kant’s own lights, always requires a concept, aesthetic judgment does not categorize its object but, instead, produces a concept which reflects its own capacity to form a judgment, to get a conceptual purchase on the phenomenon before it which is posing a challenge to categorization. The concept that is produced is nature’s subjective purposiveness, the concept that nature appears as if it were designed for our awareness. This concept is more than sufficient to answer Pillow’s question – about how a concept-less judgment can inform reflection on the content of an artwork – because it refers to a process whereby a range of possible concepts is considered within the act of aesthetic judgment, with aesthetic ideas playing an active role in the stimulation of concepts. Pillow turns to the sublime, I suggest, because he thinks it is the only way of involving a judgment-resistant network of connotations that might constitute (not so much a resistant but) a playful reflection on the thematic material imparted by a work of art. However, aesthetic judgment already does this.

CONCLUSION
The phenomenon of inventive metaphor is a concentration of the problem faced by Kant in the *Critique of Pure Reason*: how is it possible for an operation (experience for Kant and metaphor for Hausman and Ricoeur) to acquire objectivity given its basis in subjectivity? Heidegger’s retrieval of Kant, I have argued, explains how subjectivity can create objectivity. The objective validity of the categories is shown to be a consequence of the possibility created by the relation in which empirical intuition stands to time, the pure form of intuition. Heidegger argues that the essent is able to manifest itself as an object within finite experience prior to its being represented in intuition because the transcendental imagination antecedently creates a horizon of objectivity before which determinate intuition is able to appear. What is produced by the transcendental imagination is the schema of an object in general that not only ‘holds open’ a space in which intuitions can be temporally run together and connected, but also represents the structure of primordial time whereby the subject is originally able to propose and apprehend something distinct from itself. Objectivity is presented ultimately as the difference between how an essent appears and how it might have appeared within the possibility of receptivity created by the schema producing a transcendental object for a category.

Hausman endeavours to resolve the paradox that a metaphor creates new insight yet, in doing so, nevertheless discovers something significant that constrains it as something already in the world would do. He devises the notion of a metaphorical referent: an ‘object’ which is both the product and the objectifying condition of a metaphor. The latter aspect confirms that the relation between description and reality is such that degrees of appropriateness and, therefore, appropriateness *per se* are possible. Despite the epistemological and ontological difficulties which Hausman creates with the extraconceptual condition, I have shown that the transcendentalism implicit in his notion of a *unique* referent can nevertheless supply the objectivity he requires. His uniqueness condition, like the transcendental object, is the projection of an object in general which entertains the particular wholly in virtue of the other, alternative appearances that empirical experience supplies, and it is against this backdrop of the
differences in salient features that Hausman’s criterion of appropriate description can apply.

For Ricoeur, the objectivity of a figure derives from the play of actuality and potentiality which occurs at the intersection of metaphorical and speculative discourse. His claim that the necessity of predicative, claim-making discourse issues from the transcendental structures of the mind, I have argued, can be taken as a reference to the schematic production of a transcendental object. The transcendental object represents both the definite something about which categorical judgment can be made, and the scope of possibility which allows the essent to appear in a multiplicity of ways to consciousness. Furthermore, the essent can only manifest itself before the mind on the basis that it could always appear otherwise than it does, and it is this retort to routine cognition which corroborates Ricoeur’s avowal that the metaphorical suspension of everyday perception is comparable to the Kantian schema.

While, on my account, cognition is generated schematically as a network of possibilities, Pillow offers sublime reflection as a way of ‘thickening’ or ‘possibilizing’ judgment. Some common ground exists between our theories on account of the kinship between McDowell’s concept of second nature, upon which Pillow relies, and Heidegger’s ontology. However, Pillow’s concept of metaphor as sublime reflection is questionable on Kantian grounds due to the constructive resistance to judgment which it performs already being included in Kant’s aesthetic ideas. It is the role played by aesthetic ideas in Kant’s third Critique, and their contribution to the metaphorical structure of Kant’s theory of judgment, that I turn to now.

NOTES

1 In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues for the finitude of human cognition: he demonstrates the possibility of knowledge within experience and the impossibility of
knowledge beyond the limits of experience. The thing in itself or noumenon is a limiting concept employed in the latter demonstration, the counterpart of the ‘enabling’ concept of a transcendental object which operates in the former. In arguing for finitude, Kant is opposing the attempts made by traditional ontology to describe empirically the ontological nature of beings. Ontological knowledge of objects, he declares, is a transcendental, enabling condition of the possibility of empirical knowledge of objects and, as such, offers nothing real, actual or definite which can be articulated about them. To have empirical knowledge of the ontological nature of an object is impossible, he claims, because there is no intuition to support such awareness (Kant 1929: A 139-40, B 178-9).

The reliance on the notion of metaphorical discourse to explain the production of new metaphorical meaning does not mean that Ricoeur’s theory is circular, using the phenomenon to be explained as part of the explanation. Rather, to reword his thesis, it is necessary to posit the existence of a metaphorical discourse in order to show that the phenomenon of metaphor as we understand it intuitively is only the recognizable phenomenon that it is because it occurs at the intersection of the metaphorical and the speculative. Ricoeur is, in effect, using as an explanation the fact that metaphor is only the perplexing phenomenon it is because, despite the semiotic disruption which it commits, it nevertheless creates pertinent meaning. If the combination of terms in a metaphor never attained a degree of significance beyond random association, then metaphor would not be metaphor.

For a fuller account of diaphor and epiphor, see Wheelwright 1971: 71-91.

The quotation is from Kant’s On the Progress of Metaphysics since Leibniz and Wolff, Ak. XX, 279-80, included in a footnote by Pluhar in his translation of the Critique of Judgment.

The distinction between the pure and the empirical corresponds to the backtracking of possibilities which, Heidegger maintains, is the actual course of Kant’s critical enquiry. Kant uses the word ‘pure’ to describe the principles of organization which are produced by the mind itself in advance of and without derivation from any particular experience, and which are always active in organizing empirical intuition. Pure reason, for Kant, is that faculty which ‘contains the principles whereby we know
anything absolutely a priori” (1929: A 11, B 24). All that is given to pure reason in the way of intuition requires the determination which pure reason itself produces in order for the essent to be apprehended as an object. It is these principles as they apply to empirical intuition which constitute knowledge of the conditions of the possibility of (empirical) knowledge.

There is a correspondence between Heidegger’s ontological–ontic distinction and Kant’s pure–empirical distinction. The reason why Heidegger introduces his own version of Kant’s distinction is that, while still working within Kant’s stipulation that experience is necessarily the experience which belongs to a subject, Heidegger wants to shift attention to the object and, ultimately, objectivity. Whereas the pure concepts of the understanding, for Kant, are the principles of organization within the subject which prepare the object for conceptualization, ontology, for Heidegger, is the characteristics within the (‘purely determined’) object which it must exhibit for it to be an object ready for conceptualization. Thus, pure knowledge is to the subject what ontological knowledge is to the object.

‘Essent’ refers to what is generally understood by the term ‘object’ and is introduced primarily because ‘object’, in the translation of Heidegger, receives a narrower, more technical application. ‘Object’ or ‘object’ is the translation of Gegenstand which, as Churchill comments, literally means ‘that which stands opposite to’ (Heidegger 1962b: 35). The ‘object’, for Heidegger, is always the object for a subject within finite knowledge. Infinite or ontological knowledge, by comparison, has no object as such. Rather, it is itself the disclosure of the essent and ‘possesses’ it only to the extent that the essent comes to be through the disclosure (1962b: 36). Reason, by looking ahead of experience, produces an object within intuition, something which stands opposite to the subject, and it is through this distinction that the essent is able to manifest itself within finitude.

I quote Kant’s third illustration of the image-like nature of the schema later in the main text. Here is his second illustration:

it is schemata, not images of objects, which underlie our pure sensible concepts. No image could ever be adequate to the concept of a triangle in
general. It would never attain that universality of the concept which renders it valid for all triangles, whether right-angled, obtuse-angled, or acute-angled; it would always be limited to a part only of this sphere.

(1929: A 140-1, B 180)

8 To complicate matters further, Kant uses the term ‘image’ in three ways, as Heidegger observes: to mean (1) the aspect of an essent which is actually present, (2) the reproduction of an aspect of an essent which is now or no longer present, and as (3) the aspect which serves as a model for the production of something (1929b: 97). What Kant suggests is that the imagination produces an image for a concept which represents the possible object given in intuition; the image is a precursory representation of a possible object for the concept which enables the concept to apply at the level of the particular. The spread of the possible meanings of ‘image’ – from recollection, through present representation to future projection – proves to be a useful ambiguity for Kant. All three senses are alluded to in his use of the term and no attempt is made to distinguish which, if any, should have priority in a claim.

9 To expand briefly on the relation between the image and time. Primordial time, Heidegger avers, is that ‘which furnishes an [image] prior to all experience’ and, given this a priority, the aspect may be termed a ‘pure image’ (1962b: 108). Kant writes: ‘The pure image of... all objects of the senses in general is time’ (1929: A 142, B 182). The schema, Heidegger continues, as a transcendental determination of time, ‘represents unities, and... represents them as rules which bear upon a possible aspect’ (1962b: 108-09). Heidegger coins the term ‘schema-image’ to emphasize the essentially image-producing nature of a schema, although the merit of the neologism is uncertain as, arguably, it obscures the tension between the notions of schema and image. The image as schema-image, Heidegger declares,

does not derive its intuitive character [Anblickscharakter] uniquely or in the first place from... [its content]. Rather, this intuitive character results both from the fact that the schema-image comes into being [through a subjective necessity] and from the way it comes into being from a possible presentation which is represented in its regulative function [through an objective necessity].
Neither does literal predication generate a single, autonomous image. One has only to recall Heidegger’s ‘house’ example to appreciate the scope of possibility in any routine observation. The difference between what we refer to as ‘literal’ and what we refer to as ‘metaphorical’ predication is that the latter prompts the reader to find new connections between subject and predicate.

I consider McDowell in more detail, but with regard to Nietzsche, in chapter 4, and in relation to the realism–anti-realism debate in chapter 5.